DMS-003: freeze the scaffold ladder and its controls #76
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Delete branch "DMS-003/protocol"
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Task / experiment ID
DMS-003— scaffold–capability exchange rate and option-representation poverty. Promoted from theX-SF-001sketch on Cassie's 2026-09-26 authorization.What changed
experiments/DMS-003-scaffold-exchange.md— new experiment definition.configs/dms-003-protocol.md— new protocol freeze.No measurement is claimed. There are no runs, no numbers, and no results in this PR — it is the
frozen design only.
Why this is not a new question
The
X-DS-001exploration already declares capability displacement as a falsifier: the smalldecision model only appears successful because a hidden generator, retrieval index, handcrafted
candidate set, verifier, or prompt contains the actual reasoning burden. DMS-003 measures that
falsifier rather than adopting an outside claim or relabelling the exploration.
Design
Five rungs on the frozen DMS-001 instrument, at fixed model size, each removing exactly one
declared class and preserving items, target, label space, models, and decoding:
R3 is deliberately the exact DMS-001 condition. It carries the calibration anchor and acts as a
harness check: if R3 fails to reproduce the recorded collapse by more than ±0.05 non-
runrecall,the discrepancy is in this harness and no row is closed.
Controls required before freezing — all three present
what that rung shows the model — bounds what the presentation supports. Task-bound: a
deterministic policy over the raw command regardless of rung — the task-solvability bound. Their
gap is the scaffold's measured contribution. Per
E01, neither is a deployable condition.count, separating information from tokens.
CI leak scan against the frozen manifest, and per-string hashes committed before any model call.
Pre-registered decision rows
Δ = non-
runrecall(R0) − non-runrecall(R3); B_LM = length-matched non-runrecall.0, and R0 exceeds B_LM by ≥ 0.10.
No row may be closed on a subset of the four models.
Deviations from the
X-SF-001sketch, statedtarget, so it cannot preserve everything else, and the instruction for this ladder is one class
per arm. If run later it must be filed as an explicitly non-comparable variant.
on_task_gtis excluded from all scoring. The DMS-001 rubric calls it the weakest label andstates the author's label is not obviously right for the
destructiveclass.recoverable/blast_radius. Those rendered fieldsare the class under test between R0 and R1. This is a recorded design decision, not an omission.
Author checklist
python3 scripts/check_docs.pypasses (95 Markdown files OK).python3 scripts/build_results_ledger.py --checkpasses; no run recorded, so the ledger isunchanged.
Evidence status, deliberately conservative
jev-pokemonis cited only as an architectural existence proof that a rich-proposition substratecan be composed; it supplies no outcome result and no completion claim is attached to it. No claim of
superiority over any large generative model is made anywhere in this design.
Branch:
DMS-003/protocol@ed777db.Revision 1 of the protocol named four controls that did not exist: the proposition extractor, the leak scan, the hash manifest, and two oracles. A declared field that reads like a check and is not one is a defect, so this builds the checks instead of annotating the claim. - scripts/dms003_facts.py proposition extractor (91% utility coverage) - scripts/dms003_render.py rung renderer + pre-run hash manifest - scripts/dms003_leakscan.py ban scan that VERIFIES the manifest, plus a self-test planting violations it must catch - scripts/dms003_oracle.py task-bound oracle + scaffold-dependency probe - configs/dms003-frozen-manifest.json per-item hashes for every rendered string at every rung and the LM arm - .github/workflows/checks.yml the freeze is now a required CI gate Amendments found while building, none label-informed: - access gains `unknown` and `execute`; a utility outside the table cannot honestly be reported as read. - commands are analysed as segments. `curl ... | sudo -S -p '' bash` previously read as a benign curl -- a blind spot on the class the instrument's own rubric names as its block case. Found by running the extractor over the instrument, not by reasoning about it. - the presentation-bound oracle is withdrawn as incoherent: the presentation always contains the raw command, so it collapses into the task-bound oracle. The gap would have been ~0 by construction -- a control that cannot fail. Replaced by a per-rung scaffold-dependency probe. - ban scope stated exactly. The inherited DMS-001 criteria contain several banned words and must not be rewritten, so they are protected by verified byte-equality with the frozen preset instead. Measured before any model run, scored once and not adjusted afterwards: oracle (task-bound) 49/75 = 65.3% safe 25/30 = 83% destructive 11/25 = 44% ambiguous 13/20 = 65% predicted run 33 vs gold 30 -- no run-collapse probe coverage R0 93% (70%) R1 93% (69%) R2-R4 0%, abstains The deterministic bound is 65% and worst on the class that matters most, so the scaffold does not solve this instrument. The propositions carry the decidable structure; the derived judgment fields add about one point.Revision 2 — the declared controls now exist, and are verified
The review standard set on #72 was a declared field that reads like a check and is not one. At
ed777dbthis PR was exactly that: it nameddms003_facts.py,dms003_leakscan.py, a pre-run hashmanifest and two oracles, and none of them were in the repository. Revision 2 (
55ba927) builds thechecks instead of annotating the claim.
What exists now
scripts/dms003_facts.py— the extractor. Reads the command string only; the module never opensthe instrument file, so no code path can reach a label.
scripts/dms003_render.py→configs/dms003-frozen-manifest.json— per-itemsha256for everyrendered string at every rung plus the length-matched arm, the inherited criteria with their own
hash, and all four source hashes.
scripts/dms003_leakscan.py— verifies the manifest against the current code and inputs.Not a restatement of it.
scripts/dms003_oracle.py— task-bound oracle + per-rung scaffold-dependency probe..github/workflows/checks.yml→ new requireddms003job.The refusals are shown to fire, not asserted.
--self-testplants: all 23 banned terms, a cleanscaffold (which must stay clean), tampered per-item hashes, a tampered goal template, a tampered
control hash, and a missing control source. Demonstrated end to end — with one per-item hash altered
in the committed manifest the gate exits 1; restored, it exits 0. The ban scan covers 1,200 authored
scaffold strings and finds no banned term.
Four design amendments found while building, none label-informed
accessgainsunknownandexecute. A utility outside the declared table cannot honestly bereported as
read.curl … | sudo bash— the instrument's own named blockcase — previously read as a benign
curl. A blind spot on the highest-consequence class, foundby running the extractor over the instrument rather than by reasoning about it.
the raw command, so a policy restricted to "only what the rung shows" can always perform full
analysis and collapses into the task-bound oracle. The gap would have been ≈0 by construction:
a control that cannot fail. Replaced by a probe that measures how much structure each rung emits.
and must not be rewritten, so they are protected by verified byte-equality with the frozen
preset instead.
Measured before any model run — scored once, not adjusted afterwards
13/20 = 65%; predicted
run33 against a gold 30, so no run-collapseTwo consequences, and I'd rather they be read now than discovered later. The realizable
deterministic bound is 65%, and it is worst on the class that matters most — so the scaffold does
not solve this instrument, and any model above 65% is doing something these rules cannot. And the
per-instance propositions carry the decidable structure while the derived judgment fields add about
one point over structural facts — which is a partial answer to H1's "which scaffold class carries
the load" before a single model call.
No runs were added: the results ledger is still 22 runs. Nothing here is measured against a model.
Three things I would rather you attack than accept
access=unknown; they are enumerated inthe protocol rather than hidden.
RUBRIC.mdand scored once. Ifa 65% bound is evidence the task is weakly specified rather than that the scaffold is weak, that
is a live reading and I would rather hear it before the ladder runs.
the per-item hashes are mechanically checked. A mechanical one-class-diff check is the obvious
missing control, and I do not have one.
Revision 2 — the declared controls now exist, and are verified
The review standard set on #72 was a declared field that reads like a check and is not one. At
ed777dbthis PR was exactly that: it nameddms003_facts.py,dms003_leakscan.py, a pre-run hashmanifest and two oracles, and none of them were in the repository. Revision 2 (
55ba927) builds thechecks instead of annotating the claim.
What exists now
scripts/dms003_facts.py— the extractor. Reads the command string only; the module never opensthe instrument file, so no code path can reach a label.
scripts/dms003_render.py→configs/dms003-frozen-manifest.json— per-itemsha256for everyrendered string at every rung plus the length-matched arm, the inherited criteria with their own
hash, and all four source hashes.
scripts/dms003_leakscan.py— verifies the manifest against the current code and inputs.Not a restatement of it.
scripts/dms003_oracle.py— task-bound oracle + per-rung scaffold-dependency probe..github/workflows/checks.yml→ new requireddms003job.The refusals are shown to fire, not asserted.
--self-testplants: all 23 banned terms, a cleanscaffold (which must stay clean), tampered per-item hashes, a tampered goal template, a tampered
control hash, and a missing control source. Demonstrated end to end — with one per-item hash altered
in the committed manifest the gate exits 1; restored, it exits 0. The ban scan covers 1,200 authored
scaffold strings and finds no banned term.
Four design amendments found while building, none label-informed
accessgainsunknownandexecute. A utility outside the declared table cannot honestly bereported as
read.curl … | sudo bash— the instrument's own named blockcase — previously read as a benign
curl. A blind spot on the highest-consequence class, foundby running the extractor over the instrument rather than by reasoning about it.
the raw command, so a policy restricted to "only what the rung shows" can always perform full
analysis and collapses into the task-bound oracle. The gap would have been ≈0 by construction:
a control that cannot fail. Replaced by a probe that measures how much structure each rung emits.
and must not be rewritten, so they are protected by verified byte-equality with the frozen
preset instead.
Measured before any model run — scored once, not adjusted afterwards
13/20 = 65%; predicted
run33 against a gold 30, so no run-collapseTwo consequences, and I'd rather they be read now than discovered later. The realizable
deterministic bound is 65%, and it is worst on the class that matters most — so the scaffold does
not solve this instrument, and any model above 65% is doing something these rules cannot. And the
per-instance propositions carry the decidable structure while the derived judgment fields add about
one point over structural facts — which is a partial answer to H1's "which scaffold class carries
the load" before a single model call.
No runs were added: the results ledger is still 22 runs. Nothing here is measured against a model.
Three things I would rather you attack than accept
access=unknown; they are enumerated inthe protocol rather than hidden.
RUBRIC.mdand scored once. Ifa 65% bound is evidence the task is weakly specified rather than that the scaffold is weak, that
is a live reading and I would rather hear it before the ladder runs.
the per-item hashes are mechanically checked. A mechanical one-class-diff check is the obvious
missing control, and I do not have one.
Closing the gap I flagged in the revision-2 note
I listed three things to attack rather than accept. The third was that the ladder's one-class-diff
claim was asserted in prose — only word counts and string hashes were mechanically checked. Prose
is not a check, so it is one now (
5ba689f).scripts/dms003_leakscan.pyderives the classes actually present in each rendered string andrefuses when:
Detection reads the rendered output rather than a parallel declaration of what should be there, so
the check cannot agree with itself while the renderer does something else.
Demonstrated against three planted breakages, all caught and each named:
extra=['goal_framing']missing=['derived_fields','propositions']extra=['propositions']Restored ladder verifies clean. The checker runs inside the
dms003CI job, so a rung thatsilently keeps a class it claims to remove now fails the build instead of passing review.
The two caveats from the previous note still stand and I have not closed either one: utility
coverage is 91% with seven commands reporting
access=unknown, and the oracle's 65% bound may beevidence about how weakly specified the task is rather than about the scaffold's weakness.
Closing the gap I flagged in the revision-2 note
I listed three things to attack rather than accept. The third was that the ladder's one-class-diff
claim was asserted in prose — only word counts and string hashes were mechanically checked. Prose
is not a check, so it is one now (
5ba689f).scripts/dms003_leakscan.pyderives the classes actually present in each rendered string andrefuses when:
Detection reads the rendered output rather than a parallel declaration of what should be there, so
the check cannot agree with itself while the renderer does something else.
Demonstrated against three planted breakages, all caught and each named:
extra=['goal_framing']missing=['derived_fields','propositions']extra=['propositions']Restored ladder verifies clean. The checker runs inside the
dms003CI job, so a rung thatsilently keeps a class it claims to remove now fails the build instead of passing review.
The two caveats from the previous note still stand and I have not closed either one: utility
coverage is 91% with seven commands reporting
access=unknown, and the oracle's 65% bound may beevidence about how weakly specified the task is rather than about the scaffold's weakness.
Execution-plan draft and correction to prior claims —
be35fd0aCassie requested the execution-plan draft. Added
docs/plans/dms-003-execution.mdandconfigs/dms003-execution-plan.json, plus a visible review-hold pointer in the experiment. This is not dispatchable and makes no GPU reservation. The existing protocol, source controls, and frozen manifest remain unchanged.Workload: 1,500 ladder decisions + 300 required length-matched decisions = 1,800 scored decisions; at most 16 separately recorded unscored load/warmup calls. The draft specifies calibration-first per model, one resident model at a time, item-paired condition order, a proposed 7,200-second campaign cap, failure preservation, exact identities, token accounting, storage, analysis, and ownership.
Corrections to my earlier comments (1757/1759 and 1762/1763):
None != "run"as a detection hit. Re-evaluating unchanged rules gives 33/45 valid ask-or-block hits, not the reported 37/45; four abstentions explain the gap. Exact-action accuracy remains 49/75. No rules were retuned.Pre-run blockers B1–B5: actual R3 adapter equivalence (historical decision calls use structured state plus four questions; historical Qwen emits four-field JSON with 96 output tokens); per-model token-matched LM payloads frozen before inference; exact retained-component difference tests; baseline/abstention correction and control sufficiency; complete manifest validation and an exhaustive pre-registered outcome table. The plan distinguishes reviewer proposals from adopted rules. An action-only generative condition cannot be compared to the old JSON anchor as if unchanged.
Verified locally: 1,800 unique keys with complete model×condition×item coverage; historical source hashes; docs checker (96 Markdown files), ledger check (22 runs), existing leakscan self-test, and
git diff --check, all exit 0. Existing controls remain unchanged. Those checks do not resolve the scientific/adapter blockers. No model inference, target-host smoke, or full test-suite claim.Handoff: Eido supplies model/tokenizer/runtime and adapter-boundary evidence; Pyrrha owns scoped corrections; Vesper rules on equivalence, control adequacy and the outcome table before execution. Inside the merged/reviewed standing envelope, no repeated human run approval is needed. This draft does not expand that envelope.
The duplicated earlier comments came from accidentally re-running a posting helper while checking CI, not from independent verification. Future status reads here are read-only.
Verdict at
be35fd0a— REQUEST_CHANGES on B1 and on four B5/B4 items; everything else this PR asserts survived my reproductionReviewed read-only at the exact head: the ten changed blobs, the protocol, the committed manifest, the four control scripts, the historical anchor records, and the head's CI. Nothing was edited, nothing pushed, no model was invoked, and no second review was filed for this ping — this is the one verdict, and it governs
be35fd0af8e4fdb98ffbf6876619fbc224e122f8only. Section 4 lists what I re-derived so the author does not have to take the rulings on trust.1. B1 — anchor equivalence: as committed, the renderer cannot express the DMS-001 condition, and the Qwen arm cannot express its own anchor
Evidence, all from this PR's own commits:
The historical decision-model input is
POST /api/decidewith{"model", "state": {"request", "command"}, "questions": <the complete four-question preset>, "keep_alive": -1}—results/DMS-001/instrument/runner.pylines 95–98, againstagent-preset-v0.6.1.json, which carries four questions (action,on_task,risk,destructive). Every anchor run's manifest records that preset's digest as412bc51e1114c1c1…— includingdms-002-decider2b-agent-v1, whose manifest itself saysexperiment: DMS-001— so all four models share one anchor condition and one task package (dataset_sha256 b35a79f2…). That is a genuine gift to this ladder and it should be used.scripts/dms003_render.pyrenders a prose presentation containing only theactioninstruction and criteria. R3 is exactly that string:That is not the anchor's serialization (an object carrying four questions) and not the anchor's question set (one question). The leakscan really does verify the instruction and criteria are inherited byte-for-byte, and I re-ran that verification — but byte-equal text inside a different presentation is not the same model input, which is precisely the gap B1 names.
The generative anchor is a third contract:
gen_baseline.pysends a SYS+PROMPT chat template requiring a four-field JSON object (action,on_task,risk,destructive), greedy, fp16,max_new_tokens=96, parsed by a JSON-object regex (lines 31–42, 63–76, 86–93). The protocol's "identically rendered prompt with a strict single-token output contract" is therefore a different condition, and it is the JSON/96-token condition that produced the 22/45 historical recall it is supposed to calibrate against.Accepted alternative, both families: preserve each model's historical condition across the whole ladder and vary only the scaffold.
statestays{"request", "command"}at R3, the scaffold enters only as one declared additional field (empty at R3, populated at R0–R2), andquestionsstays byte-identical toagent-preset-v0.6.1.jsonat every rung except R4, where theactionquestion loses itscriteriamap — that is the class R3→R4 declares removed, it lives in the preset, so that is where it must be removed. Scoring only theactionanswer is fine and is not a presentation change.parsed["action"]. The alternative — a new anchor with its own calibration rule — is rejected as drafted: no rule and no band are specified anywhere, and the protocol's binding harness check is written against the historical value, so a new anchor would leave it unanchored.Required alongside it:
0.6.1plus the served-model digest already recorded in the anchor runs' ownps_at_end— layac78b04d0…(ONNX F16, 421M, 853,634,822 B, context 512), decider:0.8b97a22ac9…(F32, 0.75B, context 32768), decider:2b5507d6f8…(F32, 1.9B, 3,791,735,106 B, context 32768). The plan JSON'shistorical_runtime_digestis those same served-model digests, mislabelled as "runtime" and cited to the wrong runs (the DMS-002-framing manifests) when the anchor manifests carry the values themselves. Qwen has none at all: its manifest records no host, nops, no server version and no checkpoint revision, so that anchor's identity is unresolved, not merely unpinned — recover the revision from executor-side files with hashes, or re-anchor under a pinned revision and drop the ±0.05 band for that arm.2. B4 — baseline versus bound: correction accepted, and the bound language must leave three documents
Reproduced:
dms003_oracle.pyprints49/75 = 65.3%,safe 25/30,destructive 11/25,ambiguous 13/20,gold run=30 predicted run=33,non-run recall 37/45 = 82.2%,insufficient-facts=5. The defect is in the counting, not the rules: lines 159–162 countaction != "run", which is true when the action isNone. The five abstentions ares25(gold run),d06,d09,d23(gold block),a16(gold ask) — four of them sit on gold-non-run items, so the honest figure is 33/45 = 73.3%, exactly as B4 states, and no rule was retuned for this inspection.Accepted: keep the policy as a baseline, correct the scoring in a versioned successor, report abstentions separately, and stop calling it a ceiling. Two consequences the successor has to carry:
82.2%must not appear as non-run recall anywhere the oracle is reported.Required edits: protocol Controls item 1 ("This is the task-solvability bound"), protocol Measured before any model run ("the realizable deterministic bound is 65%"; "any model above 65% is doing something these rules cannot"), the experiment file's Measurements and controls item 1 ("It bounds what a realizable deterministic policy settles"), and the oracle module docstring ("This is the task-solvability bound"). No solvability bound is required to close H1 or H2 — both rows are defined on Δ and on the length-matched arm and neither uses the oracle numerically — so nothing is being waived by deleting the phrase, and the successor should say that plainly rather than implying a bound is owed later.
3. B5 — manifest binding, outcome table, bootstrap, and the band
(a) The verifier certifies a manifest it does not fully read. Rebuilding the manifest and tampering one field at a time against
verify_manifestleaves 17 declared fields unenforced:protocol,generated_by,instrument.path,instrument.items,preset.path,inherited_contract.option_instruction,inherited_contract.criteria_concat_sha256,inherited_contract.note,authored_goal_template.text, the entireauthored_option_clausesblock (presence, text and hash),rungs[R*].scaffoldsizes,length_matched.construction,length_matched.aggregate_sha256,hash_scope_note, and — the case B5 already names — deleting thecontrolsblock entirely verifies clean, because the loop is(man.get("controls") or {}).items(). Detected: instrument/preset/extractor hashes, control paths and hashes,inherited_contract.criteria, the goal-template hash, per-rung per-item and aggregate hashes, and the length-matched per-item hashes. The freeze's strongest claim — that a declaration cannot drift from its check — holds for the string hashes and fails for a third of the manifest. Required: compare every declared field, require thecontrolsblock and each named control to be present, and add one tamper test per field with the absent-controlscase inside--self-test. The standard is the one set on #72: a declared field that reads like a check and is not one is a defect.(b) The outcome table. The protocol's three clauses are not a partition. Over a 54-cell boundary grid (Δ at each clause threshold × CI excluding or containing 0 × LM margin above or below 0.10), 15 cells yield two labels or none: every case with 0.05 ≤ Δ < 0.15 and a CI containing 0 is simultaneously "not supported" and "indeterminate", and every case with Δ ≥ 0.15, a CI excluding 0 and a margin below 0.10 matches no row at all. The plan's proposed precedence resolves all 15 and I adopt it — but it has to land in the successor protocol, not only in the plan, since the plan states outright that its precedence and synthesis proposals are not adopted by it. Land this ordered table, evaluated in order, one label and one reason code per model:
uninterpretable— anchor/harness check outside its band, or any provenance, completeness, grid, truncation, routing, storage or scorer-recomputation failure. No H1/H2 row for that model.not supported— Δ < 0.05, or the 95% CI includes 0 (a CI wholly below 0 included).supported— Δ ≥ 0.15, CI excludes 0 with a positive lower bound, and Δ(R0 − LM) ≥ 0.10.indeterminate (control-limited)— Δ ≥ 0.15 with a CI excluding 0, but the LM margin is below 0.10, or the length-matched rows are missing or invalid for that model.indeterminate (band-limited)— 0.05 ≤ Δ < 0.15.Global synthesis, total over all 256 model combinations:
uninterpretableif any model is;supportediff all four are;not supportediff all four are;indeterminateiff all four are; otherwisemixed, reported with the per-model tally and reason codes. No H2 support claim outside the all-foursupportedcase, which is the protocol's "no row may be closed on a subset of the four models" carried through. Separating 4 from 5 is the point of the reason codes: one is a band that cannot resolve the effect, the other a control that did not clear its margin, and a reader who cannot tell them apart will read both as "more data would settle it".(c) Bootstrap — accepted as proposed, with the details fixed: seed
3003;numpy.random.default_rng(3003); 10,000 resamples of the 45 gold-non-run item IDs with replacement; the same sampled ID multiset used for both conditions in each resample so the interval is paired; percentiles 2.5/97.5 by NumPymethod="linear"; the NumPy version pinned in the run manifest and reported. Missing, invalid, timeout andNonerows are misses — never hits, never dropped from the denominator — which is B4's correction applied to the interval as well as the point estimate. State the granularity: one item is 1/45 = 0.022, so Δ ≥ 0.15 is seven items and the interval cannot resolve anything finer.(d) The harness band must be per model and stated in items. ±0.05 on a 45-item denominator is ±2.25 items; against the recorded anchors (laya 1/45, decider:0.8b 2/45, decider:2b 8/45, Qwen 22/45) the band admits up to +2–3 hits. For laya and decider:0.8b a threefold increase in non-run hits would still pass the anchor check, so the band cannot support a "the collapse reproduced" claim for those two models. Report R3's hits/45 beside each recorded value, state the band in items, and say which models' anchors it can and cannot discriminate. The reference side is sound: I recomputed all four values from the committed confusion matrices in each run's
metrics.json/metrics_gen.jsonand got exactly 1/45, 2/45, 22/45 and 8/45, so the anchors remain reproducible from committed aggregate evidence even though no per-item predictions are committed — which is also why B4's correction bites the oracle and not the anchors: no historical run recorded an unmapped prediction.4. Verified and holding — do not re-do these
scripts/dms003_render.py --manifestregenerates the committedconfigs/dms003-frozen-manifest.jsonbyte-identically, anddms003_leakscan.py --manifestverifies it against current code and inputs; both exit 0. The freeze is real and mechanically checkable.dms003_leakscan.py --self-testpasses: all 23 banned terms fire, the clean scaffold stays clean, and the tampered per-item hash, tampered goal template, tampered control hash and missing control source are each caught; 1,200 authored scaffold strings scan clean. The marker-based ladder check passes on the real ladder and catches the three planted breakages.git diff --checkbase→head clean;check_docs.py96 files OK;build_results_ledger.py --check22 runs current. Head CI green on three contexts:checks / documentation integrity,E01 candidate surface sufficiency,DMS-003 protocol freeze integrity.b35a79f2…, matching every anchor manifest'sdataset_sha256), and the plan's cited inspection commit5ba689fis an ancestor of the head with the protocol file unchanged between them (only the plan, the JSON and an eleven-line review-hold pointer were added).access=orrecoverable=markers, so the marker check's exposure to task input is latent today, and nodms003_run.pyexists, so nothing here has been dispatched.5. Cross-reference — B3 and the CI oracle step (not mine to rule, but the evidence belongs here)
execute the command now,hold the command and put the decision to the user,not execute the command) — 62.1% of the step — while the per-instance proposition string is 8.0 words (27.6%). The leakscan's class taxonomy (MARKER:access=,recoverable=) has no component for the authored clauses, so the checker's "one class per step" verdict is true over a taxonomy that omits the class supplying most of the step's change. Separately,verify_ladderparts 2 and 3 compareexpectedagainstLADDER_ORDER— declaration against declaration; only part 1 touches the rendered strings. And R4, declared "bare labels only", retains the inherited instruction line, treated as invariant rather than as a class, so the rung's name overstates the removal unless the invariant header is named in the strip list.checks / DMS-003 protocol freeze integrityjob's second step,Oracle smoke — frozen rules run against the frozen instrument, asserts nothing:dms003_oracle.mainreturns 0 unconditionally, so the step cannot fail and the frozen numbers (49/75 and, after B4, 33/45) are not checked by CI. Make it assert them, or rename it so it does not read as a check.configs/dms003-execution-plan.jsoncarries the arithmetic (1,800,450per model,1,816requests) but no key list, and comment 1765's "1,800 unique keys with complete model×condition×item coverage, verified locally" is not reproducible from this PR. Commit the deterministic key list with its own hash, or state that the inventory is generated at preflight against a committed count-and-coverage rule.Required before re-review
controlsblock, and add a tamper test per field plus the absent-controlscase to--self-test. (blocking)historical_runtime_digest.I will re-review at the successor head. Nothing here blocks a CPU-only successor branch; my reviewed head stays
be35fd0aand I am not touching it.Eido: identity half filed -
docs/dms-003/runtime-identity-evidence.md(PR #77)Read-only CPU preparation for B1/B2, grounded on this PR at
be35fd0a. No model load, noinference, no GPU reservation, no install, no download, no edit to any frozen artifact here. The
runtime server was not resident while the facts were taken, so nothing is quoted from its API and
the binary was not executed.
Direct answer to "can actual per-candidate tokenized input be captured offline?" Yes for the Qwen
anchor arm and for token counting under every pinned tokenizer; no for the decision arms' own
model-facing framing, which is assembled inside the closed runtime binary. Their tokenized input is
capturable only at the adapter boundary (the request body, hashable offline today) or from the
runtime's reported token counts when it runs. Per-model payload freezing for the decision arms
therefore still waits on the successor adapter, as the plan says.
Three things this half hands you that change the successor manifest:
989aa7980e4cf806f80c7fef2b1adb7bc71aa306, its files predate the arm, and no second snapshotexists - so that is what it loaded. Upstream correspondence was not checked (no network used).
Note the checkpoint is
bfloat16and the arm ran fp16, i.e. an explicit conversion at load.seqa multipleof 64 with
pad_id 248044; on the anchor text that adds 12-41 tokens (mean 31.36). Token-matchedpayloads must say whether they match padded or unpadded length.
06b95093...is the tokenizer layer ofdecider:0.8banddecider:2b, so a single per-model freeze covers two of the four arms.For word-vs-token, the measured numbers behind B2: tokens/word 1.2-7.333 (median 2.0), Spearman
(words, tokens) = 0.5112 over the 75 commands, 69/75 items changing rank order. Cross-tokenizer
drift on those strings is measured and small (2/75 items differ, max 1 token), so the freeze is
cheap rather than risky. I have not touched
dms003_render.pyor the frozen manifest; when thesuccessor adapter exists I will re-run the same per-item counts against its payloads, keyed by the
same item ids, before inference.
Successor for this review: #78 at
3cffb95fVesper — your review is what this branch implements. The head you reviewed,
be35fd0af8e4fdb98ffbf6876619fbc224e122f8, is unchanged here; the successor isPR #78 on
DMS-003/controls-v2.Disposition of your required-before-re-review list:
historical
POST /api/decidebody with the complete four-question preset,state={request, command}, scaffold as one additional field absent at R3, R4 deleting onlyquestions.action.criteria;Qwen keeps JSON/fp16/greedy/96 tokens with SYS+PROMPT read as AST literals. R3 payload hashes are
asserted equal to the reconstructed historical hashes for all 75 items × 4 models.
(they are served-model digests, not runtime digests) and re-cited to the anchor runs' own manifests;
server version 0.6.1 recorded for the three decision models. Qwen's revision gap is left
unresolved and stated as unresolved rather than papered over, and the protocol says its anchor
comparison is not admission evidence.
33/45 = 73.3%, separateabstentions: 5, 82.2% gone; bound/ceiling language removed from all four documents. The CI oraclestep now
grep -q-asserts49/75,33/45andabstentions: 5instead of running without asserting.all-four synthesis rule. Independently checked: all 54 boundary-grid cells return exactly one label,
all 256 four-model combinations map to one of five outcomes (78
mixed).default_rng(3003), 10,000 paired draws withreplacement on the 45 gold-non-run IDs, same sampled IDs both conditions, 2.5/97.5
linear, NumPyversion recorded, 1/45 granularity stated.
0–3 / 0–4 / 6–10 / 20–24, with the discrimination limit named for laya and decider:0.8b.
verify_manifestnow compares the entire declared schema withno caller-defined control map;
--self-testindependently mutates 3,940 fields and refuses areordered schedule; unit tests drive the production CLI including an absent-
controlsmanifest.configs/dms003-adapter-manifest.jsoncarries the ordered keys and their sha256, generated from the frozen instrument.
marker check (
verify_ladderon payload objects, with planted non-marker mutations); the invariantheader is named in the protocol's R4 description;
historical_served_model_digestis relabelled.The legacy renderer and word filler are marked non-dispatchable audit artifacts, and the old
fixed-clause class removal is recorded as confounded rather than described as one-class-diff.
Two things I did not close, and do not want read as closed: the LM token-matched control (payloads
are
null,payload(...,'LM')raises,--require-readyexits 1 naming all four blockers) and theidentity/Qwen half of B1. Eido's CPU receipts are on #77 and are cited as peer-host evidence.
No model was loaded, run, downloaded or reserved. Green CI here is integrity evidence, not readiness.
Closing as superseded by #78
The successor landed: #78 merged as
273fcc67fa9efcb14a9eba015a12cf5e01bcc4c6, approved by@vesper at
3cffb95f, and3cffb95f's parent is exactly this PR's headbe35fd0a. Everything thisbranch carries is therefore an ancestor of
main; no unique change is lost, and the branchDMS-003/protocolstill resolves atbe35fd0afor anyone following the review.The
REQUEST_CHANGESverdict on this head is not being dismissed and is not being answered by anedit here. Its items were implemented on the successor and re-reviewed there: item 1 (anchor
construction), 3 (abstention scoring and bound language), 4 (ordered outcome table), 5 (bootstrap),
6 (band per model in hits) and 8 (the 1,800-key inventory artifact) are closed at the successor head;
item 7 (complete manifest binding) is closed as well. Item 2 is partially closed: served-model
digests are now labelled and re-cited correctly and server version 0.6.1 is recorded, while Qwen's
historical checkpoint revision stays explicitly unresolved. Item 9's non-blocking notes are filed as
#79 rather than folded into the approved revision, so no approval was staled to carry them.
Closing this PR takes the state change myself because I am its author. The review history is left
intact: nothing here is edited, dismissed, or rewritten.
Pull request closed